Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. California Employment Commission by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
8-18-1944
Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. California Employment
Commission
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation













IO'~ ,., '-'1) 
• t. 74'1 -, '* 5z. 
752 MARK HOPKINS, INC. v. CAL. EMP. COM. [24 C.2d 
while the facts of reemployment differed as to each claimant, 
the facts comprising the background of the controversies are 
the same and the parties stipulated that the evidence relating 
thereto presented in one case should apply to all. Moreover, 
all the cases were consolidated for hearing before the com-
mission, which rendered a uniform opinion for each of them, 
and no benefit can result from now requiring petitioners to 
amend their petition to present each claimant's case as a 
separate cause of action. 
The commission and claimants contend further that the 
employers are not entitled to any relief because they have not 
exhausted the remedy provided by section 41.1 of the Unem-
ployment Insurance Act. This question is decided adversely 
to them in Matson Terminals, Inc., v. California Employment 
Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202]. Likewise, the fact that 
the benefits awarded claimants have already been paid can-
not deprive petitioners of their remedy in this proceeding. 
(Whitcomb Hotel, Inc., v. California Employment 00., post 
p.753 [151 P.2d 233].) 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion. 
In this case both the adjustment unit and the referee 
denied benefits. Although the commission granted them, there 
was not present the initial allowance of benefits followed by 
affirmance by the referee as required by section 67 of the 
California Unemployment Insurance Act as it read in 1939 
(Stats. 1939, ch. 1085), hence, the benefits were not payable 
regardless of an appeal. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied Septem-
ber 13, 1944. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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WHITCOMB HOTEL, INC. (a Corporation) et aI., Petition-
ers, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION 
et aI., Respondents; FERNANDO R. NIDOY et al., 
Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Statutes-Construction-Executive or Departmental Construc-
tion.-The construction of a statute by the officials charged 
with its administration must be given great weight, for their 
substantially contemporaneous expr.essions of opinion are 
highly relevant and material evidence of the probable general 
understanding of the times and of the opinions of men who 
probably were active in drafting the statute. 
[2] Id.-Construction-Executive or Departmental Construction.-
An administrative officer may not make a rule or regulation 
that alters or enlarges the terms of a legislative enactment. 
[8] Id.-Construction-Executive or Departmental Construction.-
An erroneous administrative construction does not govern the 
interpretation of a statute, even though the statute is subse-
quently reenacted without change. 
[4] Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Refusal to Accept 
Suitable Employment. - The disqualification imposed on a 
claimant by Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(b) (Stats. 
1935, ch. 352, as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 
8780d), for refusing without good cause to accept suitable 
employment when offered to him, or failing to apply for such 
employment when notified by the district public employment 
office, is an absolute disquali:fl.catlOlI that necessarily extends 
throughout the period of his unemployment entailed by his 
refusal to accept suitable employment, and is terminated only 
by his subsequent employment. 
[5] Id. - Disqualification - Refusal to Accept Suitable Employ-
ment.'-One who refuses suitable employment without good 
cause is not involuntarily unemployed through no fault of his 
own. He has no claim to benefits either at the time of his re-
fusal or at any subsequent time until he again brings himself 
within the Unemployment Insurance. Act. 
[1] See 23 Ca1.Jur. 776; 15 Am.Jur. 309. 
[4] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part) ''Unemploy-
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Statutes, § 180(2); [4-8] Unem-
ployment Relief. 
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[6] ld. - Disqualification - Refusal to Accept Suitable Employ-
ment.--Employment Commission Rule 56.1, which attempts to 
create a limitation as to the time It person may be disqualified 
for refusing cO accept suitable employment, conflicts with Un-
employment Insurance Act, § 56(b), and is void. 
[7] ld.-Powers of Employment Commission':'-'Adoption of Rules. 
-TIll' power given th(~ Employment Commission by the Un-
employment Insurance Act, § 90, to adopt rules and regulations 
is not a grant of legislative power, and in promulgating such 
rules the commission may not alter or amend the statute or 
enlarge or impair its scope. 
[8] ld.-Remedies of Employer - Mandamus. - Inasmuch as the 
Unemployment Insurance Act, § 67, provides that in certain 
cases payment of benefits shall be made irrespective of a sub-
sequent appeal, the fact that such payment has been made 
does not deprive an employer of the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus to compel the vacation of an award of benefits 
when he is entitlbd to such relief. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California 
Employment COITI1'lli,<;sion to vacate an award of unemploy-
ment L)(~lldit::; 'mel to refrain from charr.;ing petitioners' ac-
(;Ollllt::; with benefits paid. Writ granted. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Gregory A. Harrison and 
Richard Ernst for Petitioners. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney GeneI'al, John J. Dailey, Dep-
uty Attorney General, Forrest M. Hill, Gladstein, Grossman, 
Margolis & Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein, 
Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard 
Gladstein for Respondents. 
Clarence E. Todd and Charles P. Scully as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J.-In this proceeding the operators of the 
Whitcomb Hotel and of the St. Francis Hotel in San Fran-
cisco seek a writ of mandamus to compel the California 
Employment Commission to set aside its order granting un-
employment insurance benefits to two of their former em-
ployees, Fernando R. Nidoy and Betty Anderson, corespon-
dents in this action, and to restrain the commission from 
charging petitioners' accounts with benefits paid pursuant to 
1 
.Aug. 1944] WHITCOMB HOTEL, !NC. V. CAL. :EMP. COM. 755 
[24 C.2d 753] 
that order. Nidoy had been employed as a dishwasher at the 
Whitcomb Hotel, and Betty Anderson as a maid at the St. 
Francis Hotel. Both lost their employment but were subse-
quently offered reemployment in their usual occupations at 
the Whitcomb Hotel. These offers were made through the 
district public employment office and were in keeping with 
a policy adopted by the members of the Hotel Employers' 
Association of San Francisco, to which this hotel belonged, 
of offering available work to any former employees who 
recently lost their work in the member hotels. The object 
of this policy was to stabilize employment, improve working 
conditions, and minimize the members' unemployment insur-
ance contributions. Both claimants refused to accept the 
proffered employment, whereupon the claims deputy of the 
commission ruled that they were disqualified for benefits 
under section 56 (b) of the California Unemployment Insur-
ance Act (Stats. 1935, ch. 352, as amended; Deering's Gen. 
Laws, 1937, Act 8780d), on the ground that they had refused 
to accept offers of suitable employment, but limited their 
disqualification to four weeks in accord with the commission's 
Rule 56.1. These decisions were - affirmed by the Appeals 
Bureau of the commission. The commission, however, reversed 
the rulings and awarded claimants benefits for the full period 
-- of unemployment on the ground that under the collective 
bargaining contract in effect between the hotels and the 
unions, offers of employment could be made only through 
the union. -
In its return to the writ, the commission concedes that it 
misinterpreted the collective bargaining contract, that the 
agreement did not require all offers of. employment to be 
made through the union, and that the claimants are there-
fore subject to disqualification for refusing an offer of suit-
able employment without good cause. It alleges, however, 
that the maximum penalty for such refusal under the pro-
visions of Rule 56.1, then in effect, was a four-week disquali-
fication, and contends that it has on its own motion removed 
all charges against the employers for such period. 
The sole issue on the merits of the case involves the validity 
of Rule 56.1, which limits to a specific period the disqualifica-
tion imposed by section 56 (b) of the act. Section 56 of the 
act, under which the claimants herein were admittedly dis-
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qualified, provides that: "An individual is not eligible for 
benefits for unemployment, and no such benefit shall be pay-
able to him under any of the following conditions: . . . (b) 
If without good cause he has refused to accept suitable em-
ployment when offered to him, or failed to apply for suitable 
employment when notified by the District Public Employ-
ment Office." Rule 56.1, as adopted by the commission and 
in effect at the time here in question, restated the statute and 
in addition provided that: "In pursuance of its authority to 
promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of 
the Act, the Commission hereby provides that an individual 
shall be disqualified from receiving benefits if it finds that 
he has failed or refused, without good cause, either to apply 
for available, suitable work when so directed by a public 
employment office of the Department of Employment or to 
accept suitable work when offered by any employing unit 
or by any public employment office)f said Department. Such 
disqualification shall continue for the week in which such 
failure or refusal occurred, and for not more than three weeks 
which immediately follow such week as determined by the 
Commission according to the circumstances in each case." 
The validity of this rule depends upon whether the commis-
sion was empowered to adopt it, and if so, whether the rule 
is reasonable. 
The commission contends that in adopting Rule 56.1 it exer-
cised the power given it by section 90 of the act to adopt 
"rules and regulations which to it seem necessary and suit-
able to carry out the provisions of this act" (2 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, 1937. Act 8780d, § 90 (a) ). In its view section 
56 (b) is ambiguous because it fails to specify a definitt' 
period of disqualification. The commission contends that a 
fixed period is essential to proper administration of the act 
and that its construction of the section should be given great 
weight by the court. It contends that in any event its inter-
pretation of the act as embodied in Rule 56.1 received the 
approval of the Legislature in 1939 by the reenactment of 
section 56 (b) without change after Rule 56.1 was already in 
effect. 
[1] The construction of a statute by the officials charged 
with its administration must be given great weight, for their 
"substantially contemporaneous expressions of opinion are 
'~----~--~---~~~-~.----~,-----. 
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highly relevant and material evidence of the probable gen-
eral understanding of the times and of the opinions of men 
who probably were active in the drafting of the statute." 
(White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 [62 S.Ct. 
425, 86 L.Ed. 619]; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 
282 U.S. 375, 378 [51 S.Ct. 144, 75 L.Ed. 397]; Riley v. 
Thompson, 193 Cal. 773, 778 [227 P. 772] ; County of Los An-
geles v. Frisbie, 19 Ca1.2d 634, 643 [122 P.2d 526] ; County 
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 17 Ca1.2d 707, 712 [112 P.2d 
10] ; see, Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 
54 Harv.L.Rev. 398, 405; 27 Cal.L.Rev. 578; 23 Cal.Jur. 
776.) When an administrative interpretation is of long stand-
ing and has remained uniform, it is likely that numerous 
transactions have been entered into in reliance thereon, and 
it could be invalidated only at the cost of major readjust-
ments and extensive litigation. (Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 
U.S. 371, 403 [63 S.Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843]; United States v. 
Hill, 120 U.S. 169, 182 [7 S.Ct. 510, 30 L.Ed. 627] ; see County 
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 707, 712 [112 P. 
2d 10]; Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners, 21 
Cal.2d 399, 402 [132 P.2d 804].) Whatever the force' of 
administrative construction, however, final responsibility for 
the interpretation of the law rests with the courts. "At most 
administrative practice is a weight in the scale, to be con-
sidered but not to be inevitably followed .... While we are 
of course bound to weigh seriously such rulings, they are 
never conclusive." (F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 
91 F.2d 973, 976.) [2] An administrative officer may not 
make a rule or regulation that alters or enlarges the terms 
of a legislative enactment. (California Drive-In Restaurant 
Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 
1028] ; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com., 17 
Ca1.2d 321, 326 [109 P.2d 935]; Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 
Cal. 148, 161 [273 P. 797] ; Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 
1, 21 [251 P. 784] ; Hodge v. McCall, 185 Cal. 330, 334 [197 
P. 86] ; Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner 
of Int. Rev., 297 U.S. 129 [56 KCt. 397, 80 L.Ed. 528] ; Mont-
gomery v. Board of Administration, 34 Cal.App.2d 514, 521 
[93 P.2d 1046,94 A.L.R. 610].) [3] Moreover, an erroneous 
administrative construction does not govern the interpretation 
of a statute, even though the statute is subsequently reenacted 
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without change. (Biddle v. Oommissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 302 U.S. 573, 582 [58 S.Ct. 379, 82 L.Ed. 431] ; Hough-
ton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88 [24 S.Ot. 590, 48 L.Ed. 888] ; Iselin 
v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 [46 S.Ot. 248, 70 L.Ed. 
566] ; Lo'uisville (0 N. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740, 
757 [G1 S.Ot. 207, 75 L.Ed. 672] ; P. W. Woolworth 00. v. 
United 8tntcs, !Jl F.2d 973, 976; Pacfic Greyhound Lines v. 
Johnson, 54 Cal.App.2d 297, 303 [129 P.2d 32] ; see Helver-
ing v. Wilshire Oil 00., 308 U.S. 90, 100 [60 S.Ot. 18, 84 
L.Ed. 101] ; Hclvering v Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 [60 S.Ct. 
44'.l:, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368] ; Federal Oomm. Oom. V. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U.S. 132, 137 [61 S.Ot. 
152, 85 L.Ed. 87] ; Feller, Addendum to the RegUlations Prob-
lem, 54 Hurv.L.Rev. 1311, and articles there cited.) 
In the present case Rule 56.1 was first adopted by the com-
mission in 1938. It was amended twice to make minor changes 
in language, and again in 1942 to extend the maximum period 
of disqualification to six weeks. The commission's construction 
of section 56 (b) has thus heen neither uniform nor of long 
standing. Moreover, the section is not ambiguous, nor does 
it fail to indicate the extent of the disqualification. [4] The 
disqualification imposed upon a claimant who without good 
cause "has refused to accept suitable employment when 
offered to him, or failed to apply for suitable employment 
when notified by the district public employment office" is an 
absolute disqualification that necessarily extends throughout 
the period of his unemployment entailed by his refusal to 
accept suitable employment, and is terminated only by his 
subsequent employment. (Accord: 5 C.C.H. Unemployment 
Insurance Service 35,100, par. 1965.04 [N.Y.App.Bd.Dec. 
830-39, 5/27/39].) The Unemployment Insurance Act was 
expressly intended to establish a system of unemployment in-
surance to provide benefits for "persons unemployed through 
no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemploy-
ment .... " (Stats. 1939, eh. 564, § 2; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 1.) The public policy of the State 
as thus declared by the J..Jegislature was intended as a guide 
to the interpretation and applieation of the act. (Ibid.) 
[5] One who refuses suitable employment without good cause 
is not involuntarily unemployed through no fault of his own. 
He has no claim to benefits either at the time of his refusal or 
at any subsequent time ulltil he again brings himself within 
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the provisions 6f the statute. (See 1 C.C.H. Unemployment 
Insurance Service 869, par. 1963.) Section 56 (b) in excluding 
absolutely from benefits those who without good cause have 
demonstrated an unwillingness to work at suitable employ-
ment stands out in contrast to other sections of the act that 
impose limited disqualifications. Thus, section 56 (a) disquali-
fies a person who leaves his work because of a trade dispute 
for the period during which he continues ont of work by rea-
son of the fact that the trade dispute is still in active progress 
in th:o establishment in which he was employed; and other sec-
tions at the time in question disqualified for a fixed number 
of weeks persons discharged for misconduct, persons who left 
their work voluntarily, and those who made wilful misstate-
ments. (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8780(d), §§ 56(a), 
55, 58(e); see, also, Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 14; Deering's Gen. 
Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 58.) Had the Legislature in-
tended the disqualification imposed by section 56 (b) to be sim-
ilarly limited, it would have expressly so provided. [6] Rule 
56.1, which attempts to create such a limitation by an admin-
istrative ruling, conflicts with the statute and is void. (Hodge 
v. MeOall, supra; Manhattan General Equipment CO. V. Com-
missioner of Int. Rev., 297 U.S. 129, 134 [56 S.Ot. 397, 80 
L.Ed. 528] ; see Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. California Employment 
Oom., 17 Ca1.2d 321, 326 [109 P.2d 935].) Even if the failure 
to limit the disqualification were an oversight on the part of 
the Legislature, the commission would have no power to rem· 
edy the omission. [7] The power given it to adopt rules and 
regulations (§ 90) is not a grant of legislative power (see 40 
Columbo L. Rev. 252; cf. Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Supp., 
Act 8780 (d), § 58 (b)) and in promulgating such rules it may 
not alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope. 
(Hodge V. McCall, supra; Bank of Italy V. Johnson, 200 Cal. 
1, 21 [2G1 P. 784]; Manhattan General Equipment CO. V. 
Commissioner of Int. Rev., supra; Koshland V. Helvering, 298 
U.S. 441 [56 S.Ot. 767, 80 L.Ed. 1268, 105 A.L.R. 756]; 
Iselin V. United States, supra.) Since the commission was 
without power to adopt Rule 56.1, it is unnecessary to consider 
whether, if given such power, the provisions of the rule were 
reasonable. 
The commission contends, however, that petitioners are 
not entitled· to the writ because they have failed to exhaust 
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their administrative remedies under section 41.1. This con-
tention was decided adversely in Matson Terminals, Inc. v. 
California Employment Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202]. 
It contends further that since all the benefits herein involved 
have been paid, the only question is whether the charges 
made to the employers' accounts should be removed, and that 
since the employers will have the opportunity to protest these 
charges in other proceedings, they have an adequate remedy 
and there is therefore no need for the issuance of the writ 
in the present case. The propriety of the payment of bene-
fits, however, is properly challenged by an employer in pro-
ceedings under section 67 and by a petition for a writ of 
mandamus from the determination of the commission in such 
proceedings. (See Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Em-
ployment Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202]; W. R. Grace 
((; Co. v. California Employment Com., ante, p. 720 [151 
P.2d 215].) An employer's remedy thereunder is distinct 
from that afforded by section 45.10 and 41.1, and the commis-
sion may not deprive him of it by the expedient of paying 
the benefits before the writ is obtained. [8] The statute itself 
provides that in certain cases payment shall be made irre-
spective of a subsequent appeal (§ 67) and such payment 
does not preclude issuance of the writ. (See Bodinson Mfg. 
Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra, at pp. 330-331; Matson 
Terminals, Inc. v. Califoc-nia Emp. Com., supra.) 
Let a peremptory writ of mandamus issue ordering the 
California Employment Commission to set aside its order 
granting unemployment insurance benefits to the corespon-
dents, and to refrain from charging petitioners' accounts with 
any benefits paid pursuant to that award. 
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., and Edmonds, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion for the reason stated in my concurring 
opinion in Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Co., this 
day filed, ante, p. 752 [151 P.2d 233]. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Intervener's petition for a rehearing was denied Septem. 
ber 13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehear-
ing. 
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[L. A. Misc. No. 45. In Bank. Aug. 22, 1944.] 
ROGER AVERILL et al., Respondents, v. WALTER 
GOULD LINCOLN et aI., Appellants. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1] Appeal-Record-Alternative Method-Effect of Delay-Ter-
mination of Proceedings.-The old practice of a motion in the 
trial court to terminate the proceedings for a record on appeal 
has disappeared as a result of the changes made hy the new 
Rules on Appeal. (Rules 4-7, 45(h), 45(c), 53(b).) If the 
specified time and allowable extensions have elapsed, the ap-
peal will be dismissed by the appellate court under rule 10(a) 
unless that court grants relief. ' 
[2] Id. - Record - Objections - Relief from Default.-The d~c­
laration of rule 40(d) of Rules on Appeal that the word "shall," 
when used in the rules, is mandatory, merely states a required 
act and means that the particular provision does not permit 
of alternative or permissive procedures; it does not preclude 
a reviewing court, which ohtained jurisdiction by the filing of 
a timely notice of appeal, from granting relief from a default 
occasioned by violation of a procedural' requirement as to the 
record on appeal. 
[3] Id. - Record-Settled Statement-Relief from Default.-Ap-
pellants who filed a written notice of their election to proceed 
on a settled statement, but who neglected to serve said notice 
on respondents within the ten-day period prescrihed by rule 
7(b) of Rules on Appeal, should, pursuant to rule 53(b),be 
relieved from default in violating said,procedural requirement, 
where a copy of the proposed statement, served on respon-
dents 12 days before the filing of their notice to strike said 
statement, contained a copy of the notice of election, and 
where respondents made no showing of injury resulting from 
the failure timely to serve the notice on them. 
[4] Id.-Record-Settled Statement-Relief from Default.-If a 
proposed settled statement and proposed amendments are pre-
sented to a judge who is not familiar with the trial proceed-
ings, he may require appellant to furnish a transcript to aid 
in the settlement of the statement. If the appellant furnishes 
[3] See 2 Cal.Jur. 489. 
McK. Dig. References: [2] Appeal and Error, §§ 775, 820.1; 
[3-5] Appeal and Error, § 646.20. 
